sudo is not as bad as Linux Journal would have you believe

Fear, uncertainty, and doubt (FUD) is often used to undercut the use of open source solutions, particularly in enterprise settings. And the arguments are sometimes valid, but that’s not a requirement. So long as you make open source seem risky, it’s easier to push your solution.

I was really disappointed to see Linux Journal run a FUD article as sponsored content recently. I don’t begrudge them for running sponsored content generally. They clearly label it and it takes money to run a website. Linux Journal pays writers and that money has to come from somewhere. But this particular article was tragic.

Chad Erbe uses “Four Hidden Costs and Risks of Sudo Can Lead to Cybersecurity Risks and Compliance Problems on Unix and Linux Servers” to sow FUD far and wide. sudo, if you’re not familiar with it, is a Unix command that allows authorized users to run authorized commands with elevated privileges. The most common use case is to allow administrators to run commands as the root user, but it can also be used to give, for example, webmasters the ability to restart the web server without giving them full access.

So what’s wrong with this article?

Administrative costs

Erbe argues that using sudo adds administrative overhead because you have to maintain the configuration file. It’s 2017: if you’re not using configuration management already then you’re probably a lost cause. You’re not adding a whole new layer, you’re adding one more file to the dozens (or more) you’re coordinating across your environment.

Erbe sets up a “most complicated setup” strawman and knocks it down by saying commercial solutions could help. He doesn’t say how, though, and there’s a reason for that: the concerns he raises apply to any technology that provides the solution. I have seen sites that use commercial solutions to replace sudo, and they still have to configure which users are authorized to use which commands on which servers.

Forensics and audit risks

sudo doesn’t have a key logger or log chain of custody. That’s true, but that doesn’t mean it’s the wild west. Erbe says configuration management systems can repair modified configuration files, but with a delay. That’s true, but tools like Tripwire are designed to catch these very cases. And authentication/authorization logs can be forwarded to a centralized log server. That’s probably something sysadmins should have set up already.

sudo provides a better level of audit logging compared to switching to the root account. It logs every command run and who runs it. Putting a key logger in it would provide no additional benefit. The applications launched with sudo (or the operating system itself) would need it.

Business continuity risks

You can’t rollback sudo and you can’t get support. Except that you can, in fact, downgrade the sudo version if it contains a critical bug. And you can get commercial support. Not for sudo specifically, but for your Linux installs generally.

Lack of enterprise support

This sems like a repeat of the last point, with a different focus. There’s no SLA for fixing bugs in sudo, but that doesn’t mean it’s inherently less secure. How many products developed by large commercial vendors have security issues discovered years later? A given package being open source does not imply that it is more or less secure than a proprietary counterpart, only that its source code is available.

A better title for this artice

Erbe raises some good points, but loses them in the FUD. This article would be much better titled “why authorization management is hard”. That approach, followed by “and here’s how my proprietary solution addresses those difficulties” would be a very interesting article. Instead, all we get is someone paying to knock down some poorly-constructed strawmen. The fact that it appears inĀ Linux JournalĀ gives it a false sense of credibility and that’s what makes it dangerous.